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Abstract: As the recent withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement has shown,
political volatility directly affects climate change mitigation policies, in particular in sectors, such as
transport associated with long-term investments by individuals (vehicles) and by local and national
governments (urban form and transport infrastructure and services). There is a large potential for
cost-effective solutions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to improve the sustainability of
the transport sector that is yet unexploited. Considering the cost-effectiveness and the potential for
co-benefits, it is hard to understand why efficiency gains and CO2 emission reductions in the transport
sector are still lagging behind this potential. Particularly interesting is the fact that there is substantial
difference among countries with relatively similar economic performances in the development of their
transport CO2 emissions over the past thirty years despite the fact that these countries had relatively
similar access to efficient technologies and vehicles. This study aims to explore some well-established
political science theories on the particular example of climate change mitigation in the transport sector
in order to identify some of the factors that could help explain the variations in success of policies
and strategies in this sector. The analysis suggests that institutional arrangements that contribute to
consensus building in the political process provide a high level of political and policy stability which
is vital to long-term changes in energy end-use sectors that rely on long-term investments. However,
there is no direct correlation between institutional structures, e.g., corporatism and success in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector. Environmental objectives need to be built into the
consensus-based policy structure before actual policy progress can be observed. This usually takes
longer in consensus democracies than in politically more agile majoritarian policy environments,
but the policy stability that builds on corporatist institutional structures is likely to experience changes
over a longer-term, in this case to a shift towards low-carbon transport that endures.
Keywords: sustainable transport; policy implementation; governance; institutions
1. Introduction
Recent years have seen several drastic climate policy shifts in a number of countries, most notably
the dismantling of climate policies implemented by the Obama administration in the United States
by the Trump administration. Similar drastic policy changes led by conservative governments in
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom show a pattern of political volatility that is
inherent to the political and institutional structure of so-called majoritarian countries, which refers
to democratic systems that are characterized by a two-party minimal majority political system. This
paper will aim to shed some light on the relationship between political and institutional structures and
climate policy outcomes.
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The transport sector accounts for about 14% of global CO2 emissions and it combines a number of
other interesting factors. It is a key subject of energy security concerns, a major contributor to local air
pollution, creates substantial road safety issues, and traffic congestion affects economic development
negatively. Considering the role that sustainable transport polices can play in addressing these issues,
it is puzzling that countries have made very differing levels of progress in this policy area. It is argued
that a number of factors contribute to different policy outcomes. Differing pressures from climate
change, air quality, congestion, safety, or energy security are likely to influence the time and scale of
policy responses, but institutional and political structures determine the consistency and continuity of
policy action. The combination of economic and environmental policy objectives makes the transport
sector a particularly interesting case for an in-depth analysis of climate change policies. Transport
climate change mitigation polices will be used as an example to examine, in more detail, the differences
in policy making in different institutional settings.
The political environments can be very different from country to country, which affects the
capacity to implement sustainable transport and other climate change mitigation measures. This study
aims to explore the relevance of several political science theories to the climate and energy policy
context to identify key factors that influence the policy environment in this area. There are a number
of studies examining the influence of the concepts of corporatism, coordinated market economy,
consensus democracy, epistemic communities, European integration, and centre-left and green party
strength on environmental performance [1,2]. Most studies focus on higher-level environmental
performance indicators and their relationship to specific institutional settings [1–7]. This paper builds
on these studies and aims to explore potential relationships between institutional frameworks and
their impact on policy agenda setting and the implementation of policies and specific outcomes in the
transport sector, which has often been described as one of the hardest to decarbonise [8–10].
Some of the key institutional indicators are being explored in this paper, which will aim to shed
some light on the relationship between institutional arrangements and potential influence on efforts to
decarbonise the transport sector. While this will not show a linear relationship between the institutional
settings and outcomes, it aims to highlight potential factors that can be considered for a governance
framework that can address the complexity of a sector that requires integrated and long-term policy
action at all levels of government to meet climate change targets that are in line with a stabilization
well below 2 ◦C above pre-industrial levels [10].
2. Methodology: Factors for Continuity and Change
Social, environmental, energy, and economic drivers to implement policies that increase the efficiency
of the transport sector are substantial. However, different policy environments have different effects
on the implementation of certain policy measures. While some countries have strong and innovative
local sustainable transport policy measures implemented, they lack progress on the national level
or vice-versa [11]. There is a large number of local and national policy measures that are ready to
be implemented to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and deliver on wider sustainable development
benefits [11–13]. The reason why measures are not taken-up at their potential level relates to a number
of factors, such as finance, but some are directly related to the policy environment and the institutional
structure of a particular country or city. Sustainable mobility polices, such as fuel and vehicle taxation,
urban planning and public transport infrastructure, are highly visible and politically sensitive issues, which
require strong political support, sufficient capacity at the administrative level, consensus among key actors
and stakeholders and a stable policy environment to appear on the policy agenda and to remain in place
as they rely on investments that are only cost-effective over the medium to long-term [11,14].
A better understanding of relevant aspects related to the policy environment and institutional
structures in which sustainable mobility measures are being considered, can help in the policy design
and implementation. An initial analysis of several potential factors of a transport climate change
policy framework will be explored in this paper, to build on aspects of policy integration, coalitions,
and institutional structures that influence the policy environment.
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Several potential factors will be presented in this paper to provide some indications on the policy
environment as it is influenced by uncertainty, a shared set of methods and values that is vital for
policy agenda setting, usually delivered through epistemic communities. This paper considers these
several factors as vital contributors to enable epistemic communities to influence policy agenda setting
and for policy continuity. These factors draw on political science theories focusing in particular on
political consensus, corporatism, coordinated market economy, consensus democracy, and veto players.
These concepts are applied to the climate change and energy policy context. Additional influencing
factors are assumed to be the level of integration into the supra-national policy framework of the
European Union and the strength of centre-left parties and green parties. This includes an analysis of
the level of dependence of climate change mitigation policies iwith support from these parties and if
and how policies evolve following changes of government. This analysis is intended to provide an
input into the wider climate policy debate by aiming to highlight several governance and institutional
issues and their potential to affect the climate and transport policy environment. The strategies needed
to get transport onto a 1.5/2 ◦C stabilisation pathway require an integrated policy approach and a
multilevel governance approach [12,15–18].
3. The Relevance of Institutional Political Science Approaches
Consensual political institutions as outlined by Lijphart [19] may lead to higher levels of
policy continuity, which in turn would have positive effects for the success of climate change
mitigation strategies in the transport sector. This approach also adopts the theoretical concept of
“encompassing organisations” [20] and examines the relationships between political and societal
actors and their ability or inability to negotiate policies that are based on broad majorities in both
politics and society. Crepaz [21] argues that multiparty coalition governments with proportional
representation and negotiation are more effective in lowering unemployment and inflation and
hence creating a more favourable socio-economic environment. Lijphard and Crepaz [19,22] provide
conceptual frameworks and supporting evidence that governments with consensual, inclusive,
and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popular cabinet support act more politically
responsibly than more majoritarian, exclusionary, and adversarial countries.
In countries with corporatist institutional structures, major policy issues are negotiated in a
concerted effort by organised interests. Studies in this domain usually focus on the interaction between
unions and employer organisations to negotiate socio-economic policies. Policy coordination among
organised interests facilitates favourable policy outcomes, which relates in the case of this study to
lower levels of greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector. According to this, a high level of
corporatism may influence the implementation and improvement of policies with a long-term focus.
There are a number of elements which may support this, for example: comparatively encompassing
interest groups, a consensual social partnership, and a broad acceptance of government regulation due
to a history of strong penetration of the state in areas such as the labour market and social policy [4].
Interest groups are integrated into the policy process in a corporatist country and broaden the basis
of policies, which creates a high level of continuity that is required for long-term investments. This
coalition building locks groups into certain policy directions that further enhance policy progress,
which is almost self-reinforcing [23,24]. As a response to economic downturn, high unemployment,
and inflation rates triggered by the 1970s oil price shocks, several countries with an open economy
used corporatist structures to cope with increasing policy pressures [24–26].
The concept of coordinated market economies is very similar to the general concept of corporatism,
as it relies on formal institutions to regulate the market and coordinate the interaction of firms and
their relations with suppliers, customers, and employees [27]. Coordinated market economies can be
characterised as having long-term relations between key actors in the economy. A particular focus in
research has been the relationship between trade unions and employer associations. These long-term,
cooperative relations provide coordinated market economies with a comparative advantage that positively
affects the policy continuity and policy capability of a country in a similar way as corporatist structures do.
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Hall and Soskice [27] argue that the hands-off policy approach and uncoordinated interaction
between policy makers, and economic and societal actors, characterises liberal market economies
and puts these countries at a relative disadvantage compared to coordinated market economies.
The strong interlinks between industry, banks, government, and non-governmental organisations in
coordinated market economies are considered to cause inertia, but can also result in continuity and
policy stability [27–31]. The analysis of the potential relationship of carbon intensity and continuity and
coherence indicators gives some indication of clusters of countries that represent certain institutional
arrangements and governance structures and their transport CO2 emissions per capita. Pluralist and
less consensus oriented countries, such as the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have higher
levels of per capita transport CO2 emissions than nations with a strong focus on consensus building
after deliberation, such as Austria, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland. Countries such as the UK
and France have both, leading to low levels of CO2 emissions. For these countries it is argued that the
membership in the European Union acts as a factor of policy stability [32,33]. In addition, cohabitation
(France) and the strength of the Labour Party (UK) when it was in power, are considered to have
contributed to emission reductions in these two countries in the early 2000s [34]. A follow-up analysis
assessing changes after the United Kingdom will have left the EU, may further provide indications
of the role of the EU in policy stability, following the UK´s decision to leave the European Union.
The divide between various countries becomes even more obvious when comparing the level of
consensus in various EU and non-EU member countries regarding increasing or decreasing emissions
reductions in the respective transport sectors, which reflects the actual progress in low-carbon transport
policy (or the lack thereof). This is becoming particularly obvious when comparing climate policy
approaches in the EU and the US, which will be outlined in Section 5 after some of the factors outlined
in this section have been analysed in a set of multivariate-variate correlations.
4. Institutional Factors and Their Relationship to Policy Outputs and Outcomes
4.1. Epistemic Communities, Societal Consensus, and the Uncertainties of Climate Change Impacts
While the basic physics of anthropogenic climate change are scientifically robust, there remains
uncertainty over the scale and timing of climate change impacts, which makes policy making much more
complicated than in other areas [12]. The adoption of a precautionary approach is therefore vital and the
“lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation” [35]. The debate has moved in many countries from climate science
to climate action. Since the First Assessment Report was published by the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change in 1990, some countries have steadily progressed climate change mitigation policies,
while others have experienced substantial political volatility in this area. Uncertainty about the potential
impacts of climate change makes decision-making very difficult and complex. A critical factor from the
policy makers’ perspective is the impact chain, characterised by increasing scientific uncertainty, which
is related to the complex nature of the global climate system [8]. While the scientific understanding
of the impact pathway has improved, climate change policies are often stalled by uncertainty about
risks [36]. Issues such as climate change require particular sorts of information, which are not based
on ideology, guesswork, or raw scientific data, but are a human interpretation of social and physical
phenomena [37,38]. It is argued that epistemic communities are vital in providing this information to
enable policy action and consensus building. The members of an epistemic community share the same
values and understanding of causal relationships, which creates the foundation for policy decisions
in consensus or compromise [24,39,40]. An epistemic community can produce consensual knowledge,
even if the level of scientific evidence is uncertain or inconclusive [38,41].
Epistemic communities are a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain
or issue-area” [38]. Regardless of the professional background, epistemic communities have a shared
set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of
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community members. They share causal beliefs, which serve as the basis for identifying linkages between
possible policy actions and desired outcomes [38]. Epistemic communities provide a key input into the
policy process, which is particularly effective in certain institutional structures. In corporatist structures,
participation in the policy process is limited to a small number of societal actors who collectively form an
epistemic community that has a shared set of values. Members of this community are able to influence
the policy agenda and they also provide policy stability, which makes shared methods and values an
important factor for a common agenda on which climate policies are being developed.
4.2. Consensus Focused Democratic Institutions
A central element of many consensus democracies is a corporatist institutional structure
that allows a more coordinated approach to policy making with a small number of large peak
organisations [25]. This closed shop approach enables the formation of epistemic communities as
it substantially limits the number of players that need to be convinced. The potential comparative
advantage of consensus democracies also relates to a number of other elements that characterise
these countries, such as the “shadow of state regulation” [5] and a broad acceptance of government
regulation due to a history of strong penetration of the state in areas such as the labour market and
social policy [26]. The institutional structures of a consensus democracy are the primary drivers
behind political stability and continuity that creates better environmental policies over the long
term [3,42]. Corporatist institutional arrangements characterised by a strong relationship between
large encompassing groups enable decision makers to negotiate policy in a way that is distinctively
different from policy making in pluralist, majoritarian democracies [21]. These groups are integrated
into the policy process in a country with a corporatist structure and broaden the basis of policies,
which creates a high level of continuity that is required for long-term investments [43]. Such coalition
building locks groups into certain policy directions that further enhance policy progress, which is
almost self-reinforcing [23,24].
The institutions that enable a broader consensus amongst politicians and society are described by
a large number of scholars using different approaches and definitions. This study aims to apply these
theories in a combined approach which will allow an assessment of institutional relationships that is
broader than the isolated approaches used in many previous studies. It aims to relate one particular
institutional feature to socio-economic or more specific policy outcomes.
Democratic systems can largely be divided into two major categories: majoritarian and consensus
democracies [19,22,44]. Majoritarian system are characterised by the concentration of power in
one-party and minimal winning majority cabinets, a two-party system, non-proportional election
systems, interest organisation pluralism, centralised forms of government, unicameral parliaments,
constitutional flexibility, absence of judicial review, and executive control of the central bank.
Consensus democracies on the other hand are characterised by coalition government, balance between
executive and legislative power, proportional representation, interest group corporatism, federalism,
bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and independence of the central bank [44]. These
combinations are not a definitive list of characteristics, but an indication of typical elements of countries
that can be described as majoritarian or consensus democracies.
Due to its characteristics it could be argued that a majoritarian democracy is decisive and able
to implement climate change mitigation measures faster than a consensus focused counterpart. This
argument may have some merit when looking at the amendments to the vehicle fuel efficiency
standards introduced by Australia, Canada, and the US in recent years. All three countries are typical
majoritarian democracies and changes in the standards have been introduced in the US and Australia
by Democratic and Labour-led governments, respectively. Canada´s regulation is aligned with the US
standards. This shows that change is possible and can be implemented fairly swiftly in majoritarian
systems, but this relies on support of the minimal majority, which may change and with that, possibly
support for the policy. This paper argues that the decisive factor of success for climate change mitigation
policies is the reliability of the policy environment over the long term. It challenges the theory that
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majoritarian democracies are more effective and argues that consensus orientated democracies are
more likely to be successful in moving towards sustainable development over the long term. This
has become particularly obvious when looking at the high level of political volatility of the position
of the United States in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
adopted in 1992 by George H.W. Bush although with watered down targets, followed in 1997 with
the Kyoto Protocol as major milestone, first signed and actively supported by Al Gore on behalf of
the US administration and then abandoned by the George W. Bush administration. With insufficient
parliamentary support, the Obama administration struggled to pass major climate change legislation,
but helped championing the Paris Agreement in 2015, from which the Trump administration withdrew
in 2017, making it the only country in the world except for Syria and Nicaragua not being part of
this global climate change agreement. While sometimes being slow in the adoption of climate policy
measures [45,46], the EU has maintained a steady and gradually improving approach to climate change
mitigation policy that has endured many elections at the member states and EU level. This shows a
link between institutional and climate change indicators and provides an indication that consensus
democracies can outperform majoritarian democracies by creating a more stable policy environment
through more efficient institutional relationships [19]. It is argued that consensus democracies are
even more responsive and decisive than majoritarian systems, at least over the longer term, because
of the more coordinated interaction with societal actors [21]. This positive impact on the stability of
the policy environment depends on a number of elements that are characteristic for a country with a
corporatist structure, for example: comparatively encompassing interest groups, the ‘shadow of state
regulation’, and a broad acceptance of government regulation due to a history of strong penetration of
the state in areas such as the labour market and social policy [4].
Corporatist institutional arrangements are characterised by a strong relationship between large
encompassing interest organisations that enable decision makers to negotiate policy in a way that is
distinctively different from policy making in pluralist, majoritarian democracies. The difference
between corporatist and pluralist institutional arrangements has been studied for many years.
However, there is still debate about corporatism creating more positive impacts, in particular on
socio-economic performance [29,47] as opposed to negative effects [48,49]. Corporatist intuitional
interaction is considered to have less collective protests and strikes [50], which gives an indication of
political stability. It can be claimed that corporatism is beneficial for climate change policy development
if the encompassing groups have vital interests that foster environmentally sustainable policies. These
groups are integrated into the policy process in a corporatist country and broaden the basis of policies,
which creates a high level of continuity that is required for long-term investments. This coalition
building locks groups into certain policy directions that further enhance policy progress, which is
almost self-reinforcing [23,24]. Based on this analysis consensus oriented democratic institutions and
encompassing corporatist structures are considered to be highly relevant factors for the framework
presented in this paper.
4.3. European Integration
The interrelations between European and domestic politics and policies create a new dimension for
societal and political actors [51–53]. The European level opens new opportunities, but potentially also
constrains the pursuit of specific political interests. This provides societal actors with an opportunity
to advocate for policy measures, for example, climate change mitigation policy measures even if the
particular issue has no or little priority on the domestic political agenda [32]. Even more important are
the formal institutions of the European Union, which provide the opportunity for new policy initiatives.
They also create a policy environment that is less dependent on national elections and hence less likely to
become subject to radical change after an election [54]. The “logic of appropriateness” [53] and processes
of persuasion in the European Union are mediated by the influence of change agents who persuade
others to adjust national interests to the overarching European framework and a European political
culture which aims for political consensus and cost-sharing [32]. The European Union influences
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climate and energy polices of its member states both directly and indirectly [30,51,52]. Due to its
supra-national character, the European Union is a significant policy driver. How much influence this
driver has in comparison with, for example, the United Kingdom and Germany. Both are members of
the European Union, differ significantly in their level of corporatism, but have similar developments in
energy intensity in the transport sector. Hence it could be assumed that membership in the European
Union is a contributing factor to more political continuity. Considering the role of the European Union
for example in the area of EU-wide fuel efficiency regulations, it is fair to say that European institutions
are not only a contributing, but a driving factor to more political continuity in this policy area.
Integration into the European Union as a factor of political continuity touches on various concepts, in
particular rational choice institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism (see for example: [32,51,52].
In contrast, participation in international forums and international governance structures, most notably
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) influences national climate
policy strategies, but to a much smaller degree as the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement and
the Kyoto Protocol before showed. Pressures on countries for acting on climate change in international
negotiations may vary depending on the country’s role in the international community and its track
record on climate change policies. This may influence a country’s motivation to implement policies that
curb emissions. International agreements are relatively weak compared to the supranational structure of
the EU. Hence, it is assumed that the integration into international agreements only has little influence
on the ability of countries to deliver on long-term climate change policy goals, while the integration into
supranational structures (as of now only the EU is a supranational body) does play a significant role for
the governance framework presented in this paper.
4.4. Influence of Centre-Left Parties and Green Parties
Several authors suggest that the strength of centre-left and green parties has a significant impact
on the effectiveness of environmental policies [53–56]. Green parties’ central, if not defining, political
objective is environmental protection. Hence, their political representation and influence in Parliament
and government is likely to impact positively on climate change policies. Centre-left parties are the
more likely coalition partners for Green parties and also tend to be more interventionist in their policy
making [56–58]. Several papers indicate that the dependence on centre-left and Green party-strength
is less relevant for policy outcomes than the higher level of continuity in corporatist countries and
consensus democracies. This could be linked to the integration of climate change mitigation and
energy security as important policy objectives by the societal actors. With regard to the framework to
be developed in this paper, a reliance on Centre-Left Parties and Green Parties to adopt and implement
climate change policies would indicate a potential for swifter action, but would bear the risk of political
volatility if policies are not based on a broader societal and political consensus.
5. Example: Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Regulation in the EU and US
To illustrate the role of institutional factors, this section provides an example from one of the key
policy interventions to improve the efficiency of the light-duty vehicle fleet—fuel efficiency standards.
This type of regulation aims to ensure a supply of efficient vehicles and, even more importantly, aim to
limit the level of fuel consumption throughout the vehicle fleet.
The USA was the first country to introduce vehicle fuel economy standards, in as early as 1975,
just two years after the first oil crisis, in the form of the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standard, which requires car manufacturers to meet sales-weighted average fuel economy standards
for light vehicles sold domestically. This mandatory standard was effective in improving vehicle
fuel efficiency for around a decade, with the fleet-average fuel economy of passenger cars rising
from approximately 15 miles per gallon (15.68 L/100 km) in 1975 to approximately 28 mpg by 1989
(8.4 L/100 km). After oil prices recovered in the 1980s and policy-makers’ attention in this area
decreased, so did the effectiveness of the CAFE standards. A number of factors contributed to this,
most notably that CAFE standards remained unchanged for more than two decades and failed to
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include light trucks (SUVs). In 2009, when the political environment was more favourable to policy
action in this area, the Obama administration adopted a uniform federal standard that required an
average fuel economy standard of 35.5 miles per US gallon (6.63 L/100 km; 42.6 mpg-imp) by 2016 with
an extended target being adopted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of an average
of 36 miles per gallon by 2025 for cars and light trucks, which was adopted just days before the new
administration took office. However, one of the very early steps in the Trump administration’s term
was a review of EPA standards and regulations and the Clean Power Plan, which may well lead to a
“review, and if necessary, revise or rescind” regulations that may place “unnecessary, costly burdens
on coal-fired electric utilities, coal miners, and oil and gas producers” [58].
The EU moved from voluntary arrangements with the automobile industry to regulation later
than the US. The Regulation EC 443/2009 was based on a target of 120 g CO2/km for the European
car industry by 2015 and an extended target was adopted of 95 g/km of CO2 by 2021 [59]. While the
regulations have several shortfalls, and are in some respects (e.g., vehicle testing) weaker than their US
counterparts, there is a constant process to improve and upgrade these regulations and supporting
measures [59]. Considering that the responsibility for these regulations lies at the European Union
level, partisan considerations are less of a relevant factor as members of the European Commission
and the European Council are from various political parties. The approach to integrate European
peak organisations early in the policy process leads to several concessions, but also to a broader
coalition on which decisions are being based. Energy efficiency regulations need to be based on a
durable and stable policy and political environment as they require large, long-term investments into
research and innovation. A structured non-partisan approach that incorporates the perspectives of
peak organisations representing relevant societal and economic actors is more likely to create this stable
policy environment [34]. In the specific case of vehicle fuel efficiency, the lower levels of the historic
emissions and standards in the EU may be one indication of continued and sustained policy progress.
These targets are enshrined in EU legislation that went through an extensive consultation process and
was adopted by the broad majority in the European Parliament and among the EU member states in
European Council. The relatively strong targets adopted in the US adopted through executive action
have no legislative backing and may be revised or repealed as part of the broader move of the Trump
administration to roll back environmental and climate change policy.
6. Example: Urban Mobility Solutions in India and Brazil
Political volatility can affect national and local level policy environments. While there has been
extensive work carried out on the relationship between institutional structures and socio-economic
outcomes in many industrialized countries, similar analyses for emerging economies are still rare.
The urban mobility SOLUTIONS network has worked with several key emerging economies, including
India and Brazil. The two countries are dynamic democracies that face substantial challenges from
rapid urbanization and economic development.
Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and has put forward a relatively ambitious
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) as part of the UNFCCC process, i.e., reducing CO2
emissions by 37% reduction below 2005 levels by 2025 [60]. On the federal level, however, there are a
number of inconsistencies in the policy approach, such as the halving of the budget of the Ministry
for the Environment [61]. On the local level, there are a number of cities that have been working
very proactively on sustainable mobility solutions for many years, such as the city of Curitiba that
established the world’s first Bus Rapid Transit system. As part of the SOLUTIONS project, the city
of Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais, Brazil) worked with partners on the implementation of several
sustainable urban mobility measures, such as traffic calming, low/speed zones, and promoting cycling
in the city. While Belo Horizonte (population: 2.4 million, with 5.7 million in the official metropolitan
area) has seen a seismic political shift in 2016, there is some stability in the city’s policy environment,
which is building on a coalition between staff within the local government administration who
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remained largely in their positions and an active civil society that coordinates well among the various
interest groups working on different policy objectives (air quality, safety, access, etc.).
India, the largest democracy in the world, has also seen rapid economic development and
urbanization with some of the challenges deriving from such air pollution and road congestion being
particularly prominent. The Government of India has set out a number of programs at the federal
level in the areas of renewable energies, transport, and urban development. At the local level, city
authorities often lack the intuitional capacity or even the mandate to shape the mobility system of the
city. The city of Kochi (Kerala, India, population: 2.1 million in the metropolitan area) has also been
part of the SOLUTIONS network and has worked on measures to increase the walkability in the city
and identify last-mile connectivity solutions linked to the Metro and waterway systems that are being
built or upgraded [62]. While all three levels of government (union, state, and city) have seen political
change over the duration of the project, there has been a relative level of stability, which was built
again on staff within the administration that remained in their positions, an active civil society, but also
the Kochi Metro Rail Ltd. Kochi, India, a legal entity (special-purpose vehicle) tasked to deliver on the
Metro Rail project, which effectively acts as a Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority for the city.
7. Analysis
Consensual political institutions may lead to higher levels of policy continuity, which in turn
would have positive effects for the success of climate change mitigation strategies in the transport sector.
This approach also adopts the theoretical concept of “encompassing organisations” [20] and examines
the relationships between political and societal actors and their ability or inability to negotiate policies
that are based on broad majorities in both politics and society. Multiparty coalition governments with
proportional representation and negotiation can be more effective in lowering unemployment and
inflation and can create a more favourable socio-economic environment [21]. Lijphard and Crepaz
provide conceptual frameworks and supporting evidence that governments with consensual, inclusive,
and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popular cabinet support act more politically
responsibly than more majoritarian, exclusionary, and adversarial countries [20,21]. Based on the
analysis presented in this paper a transport climate change policy framework can be summarized as
shown in Figure 1, building on aspects of policy integration, coalitions, and institutional structures
that influence the policy environment.
Sustainability 2017, 9, 959  9 of 13 
India, the largest democracy in the world, has also seen rapid economic development and 
urbanization with some of the challenges deriving from such air pollution and road congestion being 
particularly prominent. The Government of India has set out a number of programs at the federal 
level in the areas of renewable energies, transport, and urban development. At the local level, city 
authorities often lack the intuitional ca acity r even the ma date to shape the mobility system of the 
ci y. The city of Kochi (Kerala, India, population: 2.1 illion in the metropolitan area) has also been 
part of the SOLUTIONS network and has worked on measures to increase the walkability in the city 
and identify last-mile connectivity solutions linked to the Metro and waterway systems that are being 
built or upgraded [62]. While all three levels of government (union, state, and city) have seen political 
change over the duration of the project, there has been a relative level of stability, which was built 
again on staff within the administration that remained in their positions, an active civil society, but 
also the Kochi Metro Rail Ltd. Kochi, India, a legal entity (special-purpose vehicle) tasked to deliver 
on the Metro Rail project, which effectively acts as a Unified Metropolitan Transport Authority for 
the city. 
7. Analysis  
Consensual poli ical institutions may ead o higher levels of policy continuity, which in turn 
would have positive effects for the success of climate change mitigation strategies in the transport 
sector. This approach also adopts the theoretical concept of “encompassing organisations” [20] and 
examines the relationships between political and societal actors and their ability or inability to 
negotiate policies that are based on broad majorities in both politics and society. Multiparty coalition 
governments with proportional representation and negotiation can be more effective in lowering 
unemployment and inflation and can create a more favourable socio-economic environment [21]. 
Lijphard and Crepaz provide conceptual frameworks and supporting evidence that governments 
with consensual, inclusive, and accommodative constitutional structures and wider popular cabinet 
support act ore politically responsibly than more majoritarian, exclusionary, and adversarial 
countries [20,21]. Ba ed on the analysis presented in this paper a tr nsport climate change pol cy 
framework can be summarized as shown in Figure 1, building on aspects of policy integration, 
coalitions, and institutional structures that influence the policy environment.  
 
Figure 1. Climate policy governance and integration framework.  Figure 1. Climate policy governanc i tegration framework.
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The objective of this framework is to show the linkages between policy approaches and governance
aspects, stressing the point that an integrated policy approach that addresses the objectives of key
actors and stakeholders can help reach a broader consensus on sustainable, low-carbon transport
policy. It also aims to highlight that such a consensus and integrated approach is vital to reach global
climate change goals.
The indicative pathways of the various governance approaches are in line with the assessment
that climate change mitigation in the transport sector will only be able to move towards a 1.5 ◦C or 2 ◦C
scenario if all available measures at the local and national level are being implemented in an integrated
way [12,15]. If short-term technology shifts would be sufficient to reach the required greenhouse
gas emission reductions, minimal majority coalitions could deliver bold and swift political action if
political parties in favour of climate change policies can muster a majority. However, a combined,
long-term structural, technological and behavioural transition is needed for the transport sector to
actively contribute to global climate change targets and deliver on wider sustainable development
benefits. Hence, an integrated policy and governance approach is needed that builds on coalitions and
can endure political change to address the complex nature of the transport sector.
8. Conclusions
Sustainable transport policies need an agreement on the necessity for policy intervention and a
strategic, coherent, and stable policy environment. Policy interventions within the transport sector, like
fuel and vehicle taxation, can be extremely politically sensitive, even more so when they are associated
with only one policy issue, such as climate change that may only be relevant for some political actors.
They need a powerful political commitment to appear for the transport policy agenda and to remain
there ensuring that investments in cost-efficient sustainable mobility measures can endure over the
medium to long-term. Maintaining such a stable policy environment is very challenging and highly
dependent on political and institutional structures. Among industrialised countries, only the EU and
(most of) its member states, Switzerland, and Norway have shown relatively high levels of stability
in the area of sustainable and efficient transport policies. Countries such as the US, UK, Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia have experienced remarkable shifts in policy priorities and approaches,
in particular when related to climate change mitigation. These political and institutional patterns do
not re-appear in the same form in many developing and emerging economies. While political tensions
and ideologies within the political spectrum, for example in India, Mexico, and Brazil are similar in
some policy areas, the close interlink of low-carbon transport policies with other key policy objectives
such as air quality, congestion, road safety, and access creates political pressure that allows for a certain
level of continuous progress towards sustainable mobility solutions in particular at the local level. This
could be a vital contribution to a broader mix of local, national, and (where applicable) supra-national
measures that help mitigate political volatility to some extent at the different levels of government and
foster policy coherence. Similarly, the cases of India and Brazil show how coalitions can be formed at
the local level to provide a certain level of stability in the policy environment.
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